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INFRINGEMENT AND ASSEMBLY ABROAD -
PATENT PROTECTION TAKES A
VACATION IN DEEPSOUTH
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of infringement originated as a means of enforcing
a patentee's superior claim to intellectual property and was legislatively
recognized in this country by the original Patent Act of 1790.1 How-
ever, as application of the patent system broadened and technology ad-
vanced, a patentee's ability to protect his patent was diluted by the
impracticality of maintaining infringement actions against direct in-
fringers.2 In 1871, as a solution to this dilemma, the concept of con-
tributory infringement was advanced in Wallace v. Holmes.3 A line of
case law embracing this concept 4 was codified as section 271(c) of the
Patent Act of 1952.r Although the courts' interpretations of this section
led to much controversy, the doctrine of contributory infringement has
gained general acceptance. This doctrine has been most useful in the
area of combination patents. Opponents of its broad application argue
that the doctrine of contributory infringement indirectly extends the
I Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
2 As an example of a fairly common pattern that made it difficult for a patentee to
pursue the direct infringer, a private consumer might purchase an unpatented element
of a patented combination from an unauthorized manufacturer and then combine this
element with the rest of the combination (which he had either manufactured himself or
bought from another). The ultimate use of the resulting combination would be a direct
infringement if the replacement of the element in question was a reconstruction of the
patented combination. (See text accompanying notes 19-33 infra for a complete discussion
of this aspect of infringement.) In such a situation, the private consumer would be the
direct infringer whether or not he had knowledge of the nature of his conduct. The
inadequacy of an infringement action against an individual consumer or even consumer-
users as a class is obvious to even the most aggressive patent holder. The loss of good will
would easily outweigh the possibility of recovery. Additionally, the monetary recovery
resulting from a cause of action against a consumer or a group of consumers would, of
necessity, be too small to reasonably compensate the plaintiff for the costs of his action,
not to mention damages incurred as a result of the infringement. A more equitable and
effective remedy was needed by the patent holder.
329 F. Cas. 74 (No. 17,100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871). This doctrine permits a patentee to
sue a person who sells an unpatented component of a patented combination with the
intent and purpose of bringing about its use in a patented combination. See text accom-
panying notes 38 to 62 infra. The practical advantage of the doctrine is that it gives the
patentee a cause of action against a party better able than the direct infringer to com-
pensate him adequately for his damages.
4 Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213
U.S. 325 (1909); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894); Heaton-
Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896); Saxe v.
Hammond, 21 F. Cas. 593 (No. 12,411) (C.C.D. Mass. 1875); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74
(No. 17,100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
5 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1970). See note 66 infra.
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patent monopoly beyond its intended bounds by protecting unpatented
elements as well as the patented combination itself.6
The recent Supreme Court patent case, Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp.,7 dealt with an analogous area. This case involved an
alleged infringer who manufactured a domestically patented machine,
omitting two small pieces that would be present in the finished product.
The almost complete combination was then exported for final assembly
and sale to a foreign country where the patentee had no patent rights.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, narrowly construed the section
1548 right to exclude others from "making" the patented invention in
the United States as embracing only the fully assembled patented com-
bination.
Although the Court's holding, reversing a unanimous Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, was consonant with established precedents, this paper
will urge application of a more realistic test of infringement. Such a
test would seek out the "heart of the invention," a focus revived by the
second Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.9
case. Such a change is necessary to bolster the patent system by offering
the patentee broader protection in exchange for his disclosure of the
details of the patented invention. Just as section 271(c) codified early
case law and overruled the Supreme Court's holding in the Mercoid
cases,' 0 an amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 271 could codify substantial case
law and overrule the holding in Deepsouth. The purpose of this paper is
to explain the need for and urge the adoption of such an amendment
which would become section 271(e). The proposed subsection reads as
follows:
(e) Whoever shall substantially manufacture in the United States
so much of the unpatented elements of a patented combination
6 The philosophy tending to construe a patent grant most narrowly was clearly
manifested in two cases dealing with the activities of an alleged contributory infringer,
the Mercoid Corporation. The resulting "Mercoid doctrine" greatly limited the permissible
uses of a combination patent. Although Mercoid was found to have unauthorizedly manu-
factured the significant unpatented element of a patented combination, the Court held that
the patent grant could not be extended to cover such unprotected elements regardless of
their dominance in the combination. The patentee and his licensee were barred from
enforcing their patent rights against Mercoid in companion cases. Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 US. 680 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
7 406 U.S. 518, rehearing denied, request for leave to amend petition granted, 409 U.S.
902 (1972).
8 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). See note 14 infra.
9 377 U.S. 476 (1964). For further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes
101-121 infra.
30 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). See note 6 supra.
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that the patentable aspect of that combination is captured, and
there exists no significant practical use for such manufactured
item(s) other than assembly into the patented combination, and
such assembly, requiring only minor integration, does in fact
take place abroad, shall be liable as a direct infringer."
The remainder of this paper will discuss the development of patent
protection concepts and their relationship to the patent problem most
graphically illustrated in Deepsouth, partial domestic manufacture and
assembly abroad. It is hoped that this background exploration will illus-
trate the unsoundness of the result achieved by the Court in its first
decision affecting this significant area.
INFRINGEMENT
The mandate of the patent system is to implement the intention
of the framers of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power
S.. [t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited
Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Dis-
coveries."' 2 The hope was that offering this exclusive right to an
inventor in exchange for his full and frank disclosure would enable
others to have an opportunity to become familiar with his invention
within a short period of time. The natural result of such wide dissemi-
nation of knowledge is the advancement of technology through the
development and application of new techniques, processes and equip-
ment.13
A patent grant gives a patentee, his heirs or assigns, the right to
exclude others from making, using or selling the invention in the
United States for a period of 17 years.1 4 The patentee's remedy for vio-
lation of this patent grant by another is a civil action for infringement. 15
The present infringement statute, § 271(a)16 of the Patent Act of
11 An explanation of the proposed amendment and an analogous case law analysis are
presented in text accompanying note 190 infra.
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18 SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JuDICIARY, 81Sr CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print
1956).
14 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970) reads:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years . . .of the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States....
15 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1970) reads:
A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.
16 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses
or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent.
[Vol. 47:662
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1952, is a recodification of earlier statutes. The infringement concept
has been well received and broadly applied by the courts. The statute
prohibits unauthorized use, manufacture or sale of the intellectual
property claimed by the patent. To determine if there is an infringe-
ment, the claims of the patent are compared to the device allegedly
used, manufactured or sold in violation of the patent. Consideration is
given to the patent disclosure and the prosecution history of the patent
application.17 If the identical elements recited in the claims are present
in the defendant's item, there is "literal" infringement.
When a user purchases a patented item from an authorized seller,
the sale implies authority to use that item. Consistent with this author-
ity, the purchaser has the right to repair the device to keep it operable.
However, difficulty arises in determining when the repair exceeds what
is permissible and thus becomes reconstruction, i.e., a remaking. The
authority to reconstruct is not ordinarily implied in the sale of a pat-
ented item even though the reconstructed device will be used solely by
the original purchaser.' 8 The distinction between repair and reconstruc-
tion becomes even more elusive when the patented item is protected by
a combination patent under which individual elements are unpatented,
only the combination being protected.
The concept of repair versus reconstruction 9 was first considered
in the 1850 case, Wilson v. Simpson,20 wherein defendant purchaser of
a patented planing machine replaced only the unpatented knife blades.
The Court discussed tests that could be used to determine the limits of
permissible repair. The two factors given greatest weight in this deci-
sion were the durability of the part and the intention of the patentee.
The major assembly of the machine had a useful life of several years
while the cutting blades had a comparatively shorter life. Therefore,
the Court held the replacement of the blade a permissible repair within
the implicit intention of the patentee. However, the other parts were
not intended to be replaced by a purchaser and the useful life of the
machine was thus limited by the life of the more durable parts.21
The Wilson Court's analysis was relied upon in a line of cases
17 Janes, Infringement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGE-
MENT 437, 439 (R. Calvert ed. 1964).
1sWilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850). The Wilson Court found that
reconstruction constitutes a re-"making."
19 This concept gains significance in the area of contributory infringement. When an
unpatented element of a patented combination is the basis of an infringing reconstruction,
the unauthorized supplier of that element may be liable for contributory infringement.
See text accompanying notes 38-62 infra.
2050 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
21 Id. at 125-26.
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dealing with repair and reconstruction. Significantly, a number of fac-
tors besides intent22 and durability2s have been used by courts to test
whether a replacement is repair or reconstruction.2 4 For instance, the
inventiveness of the unpatented element in the combination was the
determining factor in Davis Electrical Works v. Edison Electric Light
Co.2 5 where the patent for an electric light bulb was held to be in-
fringed by the replacement of the filament. The First Circuit stated
that the filament was the distinctive element and its replacement was
reconstruction and not repair.
In Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,26 the Su-
preme Court found the patent covering the combination of the record
and the player to be infringed by the replacement of the record disc.
This holding was also based on the importance or dominance of that
element in the patented combination. 27
Other factors were relied upon in Westinghouse Electric & Manu-
facturing Co. v. Hesser28 when the Sixth Circuit held that replacement
of certain unpatented elements in a patented progressive-feed stoker
was merely repair and not infringing reconstruction. This decision was
based primarily on the factors of removability and frequency of replace-
ment of the element in question. The Court also relied on durability
and intent, saying:
22 The leading case on intent is Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882). This
case dealt with a patented combination consisting of a steel buckle and a steel strap. The
patentee sold these ties for use on cotton bales. The ties were removed by cutting them
off. Although the ties were marked "licensed to use once only," the defendant welded
the used ties together and resold the remade combination. The Court held such replacement
to be infringing reconstruction since the obvious intent of the patentee was for the ties
to be used but once. See Hildreth, Contributory Infringement, 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 512,
535-36 (1962), for the suggestion that intention be deemed the controlling consideration
and other factors such as dominance, removability, life and inventiveness are means of
determining the patentee's intention.
23 Examples of cases relying on durability are Wilson v. Simpson, discussed in text
accompanying note 20 supra, and another early case, Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany
Paper Co., 152 U.S. 42,5 (1894). The latter case concerned a patented toilet paper roll and
dispenser combination. The patentee charged the defendant with contributory infringe-
ment for supplying purchasers of the combination with replacement rolls of toilet paper.
Because of the perishable nature of the commodity, the Court found for the defendant. The
toilet paper roll, by its very nature, would have to be replaced frequently during the
useful life of the dispenser-roll combination. Such replacement of a perishable element
is merely permissive repair. Accord, Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100 (1923).
24 See Hildreth, Contributory Infringement, supra note 22, at 528-36; Comment,
Repair and Reconstruction of Patented Combinations, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 353 (1965); Note,
Repair and Reconstruction in Patented Combinations, 23 U. Prrr. L. REv. 184 (1961).
25 60 F. 276 (1st Cir. 1894).
26 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
27 See text following note 49 infra. Actually, the disc itself had been protected by an
early patent that had expired.
28 131 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1942).
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Where the perishable nature of the parts are recognized by the
patentee, and where the parts are adapted to be removed from the
patented combination and, from time to time, replaced, replace-
ment of such parts is repair and not reconstruction.29
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro
1)30 was the first major infringement case decided by the Supreme Court
subsequent to enactment of the Patent Act of 1952. Cautioning that
direct infringement is a prerequisite to a finding of contributory in-
fringement,31 the Court found that the mere replacemen of part of a
patented combination would not constitute infringement.32 Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion recognized that replacement of elements
could not be dismissed so categorically. In order to determine whether
a replacement is permissible repair or infringing reconstruction,
[a]ppropriately to be considered are the life of the part replaced in
relation to the useful life of the whole combination, the importance
of the replaced element to the inventive concept, the cost of the
component relative to the cost of the combination, the common
sense understanding and intention of the patent owner and the
buyer of the combination as to its perishable components, whether
the purchased component replaces a worn-out part or is bought for
some other purpose, and other pertinent factors.33
When the infringement concept was initially introduced, only
literal infringement was considered. However, the courts expanded
the concept with their recognition of the doctrine of equivalents. In
1853, the Supreme Court, in Winans v. Denmead,3 4 first applied this
doctrine. The modern case that is most frequently cited for this prin-
ciple is Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products5
where the Court stated:
"To temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing
the benefit of the invention" a patentee may invoke this doctrine to
proceed against the producer of a device "if it performs substan-
tially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result."3 0
29 Id. at 410.
30 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
31 Id. at 341, citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
32 865 U.S. at 346.
No element, not itself separately patented, that constitutes one of the elements of
a combination patent is entitled to patent monopoly, however essential it may be
to the patented combination and no matter how costly or difficult replacement
may be.
Id. at 345.
33 Id. at 363-64 (footnotes omitted). See id. nn.2-7.
8456 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
35339 U.S. 605 (1950).
36 Id. at 608, quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 50, 42 (1929).
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The doctrine of equivalents recognizes society's moral and practical
obligation to protect the patentee in exchange for his disclosure of the
patented item, thus preventing someone else from changing an insignifi-
cant element and claiming the whole item as new. Such application of
the doctrine of equivalents effectively broadens the protection afforded
by a patent grant although the claims themselves are, of course, not
affected.37 This doctrine is the product of judicial decision and has never
been codified.
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
Similar to the doctrine of equivalents, the doctrine of contributory
infringement was also a logical response to the practical and equitable
obligation to protect patentees. Typically, an inventor of a combination
would patent it as such if the elements were individually unpatentable
although the combination met patentability requirements5 Such a
patent protects the combination only and not the individual elements.39
As stated in Aro 1,40
[I]f anything is settled in the patent law, it is that the combination
patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that
no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.4 1
The doctrine of contributory infringement, as it developed at com-
mon law, was a tort concept. 42 It provided that a patentee could sue a
person who sold an unpatented component of a patented combination
with the intent and purpose of bringing about its use in a patented
combination. The earliest case applying this doctrine was Wallace v.
Holmes43 which permitted recovery against an unauthorized seller of
a patented kerosene lamp. The defendant sold the lamp without the
glass chimney, thus omitting one claimed element in an effort to avoid
37Janes, Infringement, supra note 17, at 443, citing International Harvester Co. v.
Killeser Mfg. Co., 67 F.2d 54, 61 (9th Cir. 1933).
38 The statutory requirements of patentability are novelty, utility and non-obviousness.
For a discussion of the modern considerations for patentability, see Graham v. John-Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
39 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944).
But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1970). This section sets down circumstances in which the
contributory infringement action will be used to protect unpatented elements of a
patented combination: when the component is a material part of the invention, especially
made or especially adapted for use in infringement of the patent and not a staple article
of commerce, the sale or manufacture of that unpatented component is expressly pro-
hibited.
40 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
41 Id. at 344.
42 REPORT OF AToRNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CommirTrxTa TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS
at 251 (March 31, 1955).
43 29 F. Cas. 74 (No. 17, 100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
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liability for infringement. The court allowed recovery on the theory
that the ultimate purchaser would supply the missing element and thus
infringe the patent by the use of the lamp. Since the recovery against
the user was impractical, the court felt that equity demanded recovery
against the contributory infringer, the supplier of the almost complete
combination.
Just four years later, in Saxe v. Hammond,44 this broad holding
was limited to the situation where the element sold was usable only in
the patented combination. If the element sold was a staple item of com-
merce capable of significant non-infringing use, the seller escaped lia-
bility as a contributory infringer. This principle was applied much
later in Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patent Development
Corp.45
The Patent Act of 1952 codified the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement. 46 In the 81 years between Wallace47 and the Patent Act
there arose a number of significant cases. In Morgan Envelope Co. v.
Albany Paper Co.,48 the holder of a patent on a toilet paper dispenser
combination brought suit against an alleged contributory infringer who
supplied purchasers of this device with replacement rolls of paper. The
Court denied recovery because of the nature of the element supplied
and its impliedly permissible replacement (repair) without direct in-
fringement of the patent.
Similarly, Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co.49 was
an action brought against the unauthorized manufacturer of sound discs,
charging the company with contributory infringement. The patent in
question covered the combination of player and sound disc. The disc
manufactured by the defendant Leeds & Catlin Company could be
used only on plaintiff's player. Recovery was allowed because the re-
placement constituted an infringing reconstruction and the defendant,
as supplier, was a contributory infringer. Thus, the determination of
the alleged contributory infringer's liability turned on both the exis-
tence of direct infringement (the consumer's use of the Leeds & Catlin
4421 F. Cas. 593, 594 (No. 12,411) (C.C.D. Mass. 1875).
45283 U.S. 27 (1931). This case dealt with a combination patent on a refrigerator
device that incorporated dry ice (solid carbon dioxide) as a coolant. The patentee granted
another the exclusive license to supply purchasers of the patented device with the dry ice.
The defendant, Carbice Corporation, supplied dry ice to the same customers with the
knowledge that the ice would be used in the patented combination. Carbice escaped
liability because the dry ice was a staple item and could not be granted patent protection.
46 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), (c) (1970).
47 29 F. Cas. 74 (No. 17,100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
48 152 U.S. 428 (1894).
49 213 U.S. 325 (1909). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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disc in combination with the player) and the absence of a substantial
non-infringing use for the component supplied by the defendant.
The Leeds & Catlin Court distinguished the nature of the element
supplied in the Morgan Envelope case from the record disc. The Su-
preme Court stated that the paper rolls in the earlier case were mere
passive elements while in the latter case the discs were "the distinction
of the invention.... the advance upon the prior art." This formulation
has also come to be known as the "heart of the invention" test.
That a patentee could enforce his patent rights against a contrib-
utory infringer was a well-settled principle until 1944 when the two
Mercoid cases50 were decided by the Supreme Court. The suit brought
by Mid-Continent Investment Company against Mercoid Corporation, 51
the alleged contributory infringer, concerned a combination patent for
a heating system. The dominant element of the combination was an
unpatented stoker switch which was being manufactured by Mercoid
without authorization. Mid-Continent, the patent holder, brought an
action for contributory infringement based on the fact that Mercoid's
stoker switch was not a staple item since it lacked any significant non-
infringing use. As a defense, Mercoid alleged that the prosecution of
a contributory infringement action based on an element not itself pat-
ented constituted patent misuse.52 This view was supported by the dis-
50 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
5143 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
52 The particular significance of a patent misuse defense or counterclaim lies in its
remedial aspects. Some forms of patent misuse involve conduct that, by its nature, con-
stitutes an antitrust violation, e.g., patent pooling, tying arrangements, and fraud on
the Patent Office. Only the patent monopoly itself is exempted from Sherman Act antitrust
liability and the above types of repressive conduct related to the use of patents are not.
A typical patent pooling agreement involves a number of patentees who have agreed
to condition the licensing of their particular patents upon the licensee acquiring the rights
to use all the patents in the pool. These agreements unlawfully expand a patent monopoly
beyond its permissible bounds and the Sherman Act exemption does not apply.
Tying arrangements condition the sale of patented proprietary items upon the
purchase of nonpatented, readily available items as well. These restrictions remove the
sale of the unpatented items from free competition and constitute unlawful attempts to
expand the scope of a patent grant.
Fraud on the Patent Office is another type of patent misuse that is characterized as an
antitrust violation. When a patent applicant knowingly and wilfully submits false informa-
tion or conceals pertinent information from the Patent Office to acquire a patent, that
patentee is wrongfully removing the subject from the public domain and fraudulently
acquiring a monopoly.
Typically, these severe manifestations of patent misuse result in antitrust liability.
The wrongful patentee may be liable for treble damages and the counsel fees of the
aggrieved party and can be compelled to enter into royalty-free licensing agreements with
others in the field. In extreme cases, the court may even order that the patent be dedicated
to the public.
The Mercoid Court held that the use of a combination patent to protect an unpatented
element was a patent misuse of sufficient gravity to entitle the aggrieved party to antitrust
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trict court.53 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,54
basing its decision on the Leeds55 case. Leeds had held that the un- -
authorized use of an unpatented element constituted infringement if
that element was the dominant aspect of the patented combination.
The Supreme Court, in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co.,56 reversed, stating that the Leeds rule could no longer be used to
protect an unpatented element of a patented combination. 7 Factors
such as the dominance or inventiveness of an element were no longer
of consequence.5 s Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, clarified the
resulting status of the doctrine of contributory infringement:
The result of this decision, together with those which have pre-
ceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to con-
sider.59
Thus limiting the patent monopoly was deemed to be justified in the
public interest and consistent with the judicial attitude that monopoly
is "evil" per se. 60
The companion case, Mercoid v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regula-
tor Co.,'1 was brought by Honeywell, a patent licensee. The Court re-
iterated its position and clarified its attitude of opposition to the use
of a patent on a combination to control the market for unpatented ele-
ments. The mere bringing of a contributory infringement action against
a manufacturer or seller of an unpatented element of a patented com-
bination was held to be patent misuse per se and an antitrust violation:
The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the
damages. This holding was grounded on the belief that the patent was being used to
protect an unpatented element from competition. In reality, however, the patentee was
"using his patent not to monopolize the sale of what is not patented but to prevent the
defendants from aiding others to infringe what is patented." Florence-Mayo Nuway Co. v.
Hardy, 168 F.2d 778, 785 (4th Cir. 1948).
53 Id.
54 133 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1942).
55 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
56 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
57 The Court's holding had the effect of overruling the Leeds case although Justice
Roberts stated, in his dissenting opinion, that Leeds had not been overruled. Id. at 675.
58 Id. at 667.
59 Id. at 669.
60 This judicial hostility is prevalent notwithstanding the creation of the patent
monopoly by Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution. One explanation for
this current attitude toward patents is the 1938 Hartford Conspiracy. This incident and
the resulting antitrust action, Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945),
arose from the pooling of over 500 patents by a number of companies engaged in glass
manufacturing. See Gregg, Tracing the Concept of "Patentable Invention," 13 ViL. L. REV.
98, 104 (1967).
61 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
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protection of the patent is measured by the anti-trust laws not by
the patent law.62
The holding in the Mercoid cases led to much confusion and criti-
cism. In effect, the doctrine of contributory infringement had been
abrogated, the patentee's protection stripped of much of its attractive-
ness, and the distinction between patent misuse and antitrust violations
all but disregarded.
LEGISLATIVE REACTION
The controversy that resulted from the Mercoid decisions led to the
passage of § 271 of the Patent Act of 1952. Subsection (a)63 merely re-
states the general definition of infringement applied by the courts. The
doctrine of contributory infringement was revived and codified in the
remaining subsections of section 271. Subsection (b)64 was interpreted
by Hautau v. Kearney & Trecher Corp.6 5 to apply only in the situation
where actual infringement occurs as a result of inducement by the al-
leged infringer. A mere attempt to induce infringement is insufficient.
Subsection (c)66 narrowly defines the elements of contributory in-
fringement. Specifically, the components of the patented device sold
for use in performing the patented process or as an element of a pat-
ented combination must be a material part of the invention, must be
known to be particularly made or adapted for use in the infringement,
and such component must not be a staple item suitable for substantial
non-infringing use. If these elements are present, the unauthorized seller
is guilty of contributory infringement.
The House Judiciary Committee67 attempted to clarify the purpose
of section 271(c):
One who makes a special device constituting the heart of a patented
machine and supplies it to others with directions (specific or im-
62 Id. at 684.
63 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses
or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent.
6435 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1970) reads:
Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
65 179 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Mich. 1959).
6635 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1970) provides:
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shah be liable as a contributory infringer.
67 House COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION OF TITLE 35, UNITED STATES CODE, H.R.
REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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plied) to complete the machine is obviously appropriating the bene-
fit of the patented invention. It is for this reason that the doctrine
of contributory infringement, which prevents appropriating another
man's patented invention, has been characterized as "an expression
both of law and morals." Considerable doubt and confusion as to
the scope of contributory infringement has resulted from a number
of decisions of the courts in recent years. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to codify in statutory form principles of contributory in-
fringement and at the same time eliminate this doubt and confu-
sion.68
Since subsection (c) specifically reestablished the offense of contrib-
utory infringement, another section was required to allow a patentee to
utilize this concept without risking patent misuse liability. The law
prior to the Patent Act of 1952 followed the holding of the Mercoid
cases and considered enforcement of patent rights against a contributory
infringer to be a per se patent misuse. Theoretically, section 271(d) 9
was intended to overrule this concept. Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Aro I found that "the legislative history makes it clear that
paragraph (d) complements (c) with the view to avoid the application
of the patent misuse doctrine to conduct such as that of the patent
owner in the present case." 70
POST SECTION 271 CASE LAW
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.71
(Aro 1) was the first case to be decided by the Supreme Court under
§ 271 of the Patent Act of 1952. Briefly, this case was concerned with a
68 Id. at 9.
69 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1970) reads:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the
following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without
his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed
or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce
his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
70 365 U.S. 365 n.9, citing HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICARY, RMISION or TITLE 35,
UNITED STATEs CODE, H.R. RE'. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) and Hearings on H.R.
3760 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., at
161-62, 169-75 (1951).
In Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro 1), 377 U.S. 476 (1964),
the Court stated that
Congress enacted § 271 for the express purpose of reinstating the doctrine of
contributory infringement as it had been developed by decisions prior to Mercoid,
and of overruling any blanket invalidation of the doctrine that could be found in
the Mercoid opinions.
Id. at 492.
The court made reference to the Aro I opinions of Justice Black, 365 U.S. at 348-49
and nn.3-4; Justice Harlan, id. at 378 n.6; and Justice Brennan, id. at 365-67.
71365 U.S. 336 (1961).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
combination patent on a self-sealing weatherproof convertible top used
in 1952-1954 Ford and General Motors automobiles. 72 Older designs
required the user to fasten external devices along the sides of the top
whenever it was raised. The new design obviated the need for this op-
eration. The patented top contained a number of major elements in-
cluding wood or metal supports, a fitted fabric top, and a wiper panel
that sealed the top against the body of the car by applying internal
pressure along the sides of the top. These individual elements were
unpatented.
The controversy arose when Convertible acquired territorial rights
to the combination patent and brought an action to enjoin Aro, the
alleged contributory infringer, from making and selling replacement
fabrics. The district court held for Convertible 73 and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.74 Both decisions were based on
the determination that the replacement of so major an element of the
combination was a reconstruction and, therefore, an infringement.75
The Supreme Court reversed, declaring, "It is plain that § 271(c)
...made no change in the fundamental precept that there can be no
contributory infringement in the absence of direct infringement."76
In the Court's opinion, direct infringement was lacking because the
replacement of the unpatented fabric element was permissible "repair"
and not infringing "reconstruction." 77 The actual test applied was quite
simple:
Mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time,
whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts successively,
is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his property.
Measured by this test, the replacement of the fabric involved in
this case must be characterized as permissible "repair," not "recon-
struction."78
72 Mackie-Duluk Patent No. 2,569,724.
73 119 U.S.P.Q. 122 (D. Mass. 1957).
74 270 F.2d 200 (Ist Cir. 1959).
75 Representatives of the Aro Company admitted that replacement fabrics cut for
the Mackie-Duluk top, due to their unique shape, could not be used on any other type of
convertible top. Thus, the courts found that the replacement fabric was not a staple article
since it had no non-infringing use.
76 365 U.S. at 341.
77 The Court apparently overlooked the fact that Ford's use of the Mackie-Duluk top
was unauthorized. General Motors had acquired a license to use the top on its 1952-54 cars
but Ford had not. Thus, any manufacture or sale of Ford automobiles containing that
patented top was a direct infringement of the patent. Further, the use of the convertible
top by Ford purchasers was unauthorized and a direct infringement as well, making it
unnecessary to even consider repair versus reconstruction since anyone supplying a material
element of a patented combination to a direct infringer is liable as a contributory infringer.
78 65 U.S. at 346.
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Additionally, the Court reasserted the concept that a combination
patent protects only the combination and not the unpatented elements
of that combination.79 It found that no distinction could be made based
on whether the element was the inventive or dominant part of the
patent or merely an insignificant part. The Court thus expressly re-
jected the "heart of the invention" test applied prior to Mercoid and
by the lower courts in Aro I.
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, construed the doctrine of
contributory infringement under section 271 (c) very narrowly. He stated
that a combination patent protects only the combination and that, if
an element is novel, it should be patented individually. Otherwise, any
member of the public has the right to make the part except where it is
knowingly supplied for a new making of what is in effect the whole
combination."0 Finally, Justice Black joined the majority in rejecting
the "heart of the invention" test for infringement, whether direct or
contributory.8'
Although the Aro I holding was a 6-3 decision, the reasoning of the
Court was more evenly split. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Whit-
taker, Douglas, Clark, and Black held the test of infringement to be a
narrow interpretation of "reconstruction," that is, the combination is
merely repaired so long as at least one element is left untouched.82 Justice
Brennan joined the dissenters, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Stewart,
in calling for a broader test of repair versus reconstruction, 3 a test
to be based on a collection of factors from the Court's earlier decisions,
including, in particular, the "inventive" factor.8 4 The dissent's argu-
ment is particularly persuasive in light of the express intent of the
79 Id. at 344, citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 676 (1944).
80 365 U.S. at 362. The knowing supply of a part for use in the whole combination
could make the supplier a contributory infringer.
81 A patented combination is no more than that, a novel relationship brought to
bear on what presumably are familiar elements already in the public domain.
Such familiar elements are not removed from the public domain merely because
of their use, however crucial, in the novel combination.
Id. at 361 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
82 An inconsistency in the opinion must be pointed out. The majority, at 365 U.S. 346,
cited the Cotton Tie case, as an example of reconstruction by "second creation." However,
under the majority's new test set down on the same page of the opinion, the Cotton Tie
situation would be a prime example of mere repair. The combination consisted of two
separate elements, the buckle and the strap. Replacing only the strap element left the
buckle element untouched. Thus, under the new test, such replacement would constitute
repair and not the reconstruction which Cotton Tie had held it to be. See 32 U. Cm. L.
R v. 353, 360 (1965); 49 CAUiF. L. Rv. 988, 992 (1961).
83 365 U.S. at 363.
84 See Hildreth, Contributory Infringement, supra note 22, at 537-40.
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drafters of section 271(c): restoration of the concept of contributory
infringement as it existed prior to the Mercoid cases.8 5
Aro I's treatment of precedents caused much confusion.8s As a
result, in 1964, Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther87 came before the Court.
Defendant petitioner had purchased four patented fish canning ma-
chines in nonoperable condition. Complete sandblasting of the ma-
chines and grinding of some elements was required to restore them to
working order. In the process of restoration, six of the 35 unpatented
elements were modified so that the machine would pack a five ounce can
of fish instead of the one pound can it had originally been designed for.
The patentee's ensuing infringement action against the purchaser was
upheld by the district court.88
The petitioner argued that, under the Aro I test,89 the individual
elements could have been replaced with identical elements without in-
fringing the patent so long as at least one element remained untouched.
Thus, it was contended, a finding of non-infringement should also result
if the same elements are merely ground to a different size or relocated.
However, the district court based its decision on the determination
that changing the essential elements of the machine was reconstruction
and not merely repair.90
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 9l but the Su-
preme Court reversed on the basis of the principle that a combination
patent protects only the entire combination, not the elements. 92 The
petitioner had modified only six elements, 93 the size and location of
which were not covered by the patent claims. 4 The Court held that
85 Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., 151 (1951). See Connor, The Second Aro Case: A Realignment of the
Supreme Court on the Matter of Contributory Infringement of a Combination Patent, 34
U. Cm. L. Rxv. 127 n.18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Connor].
The codification of the doctrine of contributory infringement in § 271(c) of the Patent
Act of 1952 must be considered an expansion of patent protection. The traditional judicial
hostility toward the patent monopoly is the only possible explanation for the consistent
refusal of the courts to acknowledge the explicit intent of the framers of the Patent Act.
The report of the House Committee on the Judiciary expressly states the purpose of
§ 271(c) as "codifying the principles of contributory infringement" and "eliminating the
doubt and confusion." HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVISION or TrrLE 35, UNrrEn
STATES CoDE, H.R. RaP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952).
86 Note, Repair and Reconstruction of Patented Combinations, 32 U. CHi. L. REv.
353, 360-61 n.48 (1965).
87 377 U.S. 422 (1964).
88 Kuther v. Leuscher, 200 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
89 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
90 200 F. Supp. at 842.
91 Leuscher v. Kuther, 314 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1963).
92 377 US. 422 (1964).
93 The claimed invention included a total of 35 elements.
94 377 U.S. at 423.
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such replacement was within the rights purchased by the petitioner and
constituted repair, not reconstruction. The abandonment of the "heart
of the invention" concept after Aro I made it clear that the existence
of 29 unchanged elements sufficed to classify the replacement as a mere
repair even though the essential elements were in fact modified.
Unlike the lower courts in the Wilbur-Ellis case, most lower courts
interpreted the Aro I decision as greatly limiting the power of a patent
grant to protect the elements of a patented combination. In Switzer
Brothers v. Locklin,95 a particularly noteworthy case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the Mercoid rule had not been vacated by section 271(c).
Instead, as had been stated in Aro I, the monopoly granted to the pat-
entee applied only to the entire patented combination and not to the
elements thereof regardless of their essential nature. 6
Similarly, in Pierce v. Aeronautical Communication Equipment,
Inc.,97 the Fifth Circuit refused to find double patenting98 where an ele-
ment of a patented combination was separately patented. A combination
patent covered an electrical circuit containing a Pierce oscillator, among
other elements. Seven years later, a second patent was issued for the
oscillator element alone. The court of appeals overruled the district
court's finding of double patenting,99 citing Aro I and Mercoid for the
proposition that a combination patent protects only the combination
and not the individual elements regardless of their essential nature.
Thus, a second patent on the oscillator alone would not give rise to
double patenting for that individual element received no protection
from the combination patent. 00
95 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961). This case dealt with an assignee of several patents for
fluorescent fixtures and displays. The plaintiff assignee required that licensees purchase
from him the raw materials needed to produce the fixtures. Although the materials in
question were raw materials and not included in a patent grant, the assignee tried to
invoke the protection of section 271(c). Not only did the Seventh Circuit state that
section 271(c) did not abrogate the Mercoid doctrine but it also asserted that Aro affirmed
that same doctrine. Thus, the elements of the combination would not be covered by the
patent. Furthermore, the court stated that, after Art, it could no longer be argued that
section 271(c) overruled the Mercoid holdings.
O1d. at 46.
97 307 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1962). See Connor, supra note 85, at 127 for a complete
discussion of this point.
98 Double patenting occurs when the same invention receives patent protection from
more than one patent. The effect of a double patenting situation could be to extend the
patent protection beyond the statutory 17-year period. To avoid such a result, the later
patent is declared invalid. The significance of this rule is demonstrated by a situation like
the Pierce case where one separately patented element was part of a patented combination.
If the combination patent was held to give protection to the already patented oscillator
element, the later combination patent would have been declared invalid as a form of
double patenting.
99 198 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
100 307 F.2d at 795. The oscillator patent was held to be invalid by the First Circuit in
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It was necessary to mitigate the absolute rule the lower courts had
derived from the Aro I case. The refusal to protect any element of a
combination patent regardless of its essential nature created a situation
that required the Supreme Court to reanalyze its Aro I holding.
THE SECOND ARO CASE (ARO I)
Such an opportunity to assess the effect of the Aro I decision oc-
curred in 1964 when the Aro case' 01 which had been remanded to the
district court 102 and then appealed to the court of appeals, 1 3 once again
came to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. This second decision
sounded a retreat from much of the holding in Aro I. Aro II drew a
sharp distinction between the claims with respect to the licensed use of
the convertible tops in General Motors cars and the unlicensed use in
Ford cars.104 In Aro II, the Court claimed it had never intended, in
Aro I, to reverse the original court of appeals' finding of contributory
infringement with respect to Aro's supplying of the fabric elements for
use as replacements in Ford cars. In fact, however, there had been no
such apparent distinction made in Aro I since the Court had ordered
the case as a whole "reversed and remanded."
On remand, the district court, acting under the Supreme Court
order, entered a judgment negating any allegation of infringement,
either direct or contributory. Convertible Top appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit'0 5 which reversed the lower court deter-
mination with respect to the fabric elements supplied for use on Ford
cars. The circuit court was in the unusual position of having to explain
its own holding in the first Aro case in order that the precise scope of
the earlier decision might be determined 08 Such analysis was needed
Pierce v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 220 F.2d 531, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 833 (1955), and by the
Third Circuit in Pierce v. Allen B. DuMont Laboratories, 297 F.2d 323 (1961), although
the latter court did not reach the same issue. The holding in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories
v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), has since obviated the need for multiple
litigation on the validity of a single patent by abolishing the requirement of mutuality of
estoppel. Now, once a patent is held invalid by one court, an alleged infringer may use
the defense of collateral estoppel provided the invalidating judgment was rendered under
conditions meeting the Supreme Court's fairness test outlined in Blonder-Tongue.
101 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
102 (S.D. Mass. 1961) (unreported decision).
103 312 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir. 1962).
104 General Motors had acquired a license to use the patented top combination while
Ford had no such license. Thus, Ford's use was a direct infringement of the combination
patent-a prerequisite for a finding of contributory infringement liability that obviated
the need for a repair versus reconstruction analysis.
'05 312 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1962).
106 Through Chief Judge Woodbury, the court of appeals acknowledged the summary
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to, in turn, define the parameters of the Supreme Court's reversal in
Aro I.
In particular, the First Circuit directed its attention to a considera-
tion of whether Aro I reviewed (and thus reversed) a decision covering
the contributory infringement aspects of Aro's conduct with respect to
both General Motors and Ford Cars or General Motors cars alone. In a
very persuasive opinion, the court of appeals found that the Supreme
Court's Aro I decision dealt only with the question of contributory in-
fringement in relation to replacement tops for licensed General Motors
cars.'07 Speaking for the Court in Aro II, Justice Brennan 08 agreed,
declaring, in reference to Aro 1, "Our decision dealt, however, only with
the General Motors and not with the Ford cars." 109
Aro II had significant impact on three areas of prime concern to
patent lawyers:" 0 the vitality of the Mercoid doctrine, the effect of
licensing, and the concept of "heart of the invention." First, Aro II
expressly recognized that the legislative intent behind the enactment of
section 271 was the restoration of the pre-Mercoid doctrine of contrib-
utory infringement."' The Court held that contributory infringement
actions seeking to protect substantial unpatented elements under com-
bination patents would no longer be barred as per se patent misuse. 12
The impact of Aro I's holding on the area of licensing is not as
easy to assess. The case is generally cited as authority for the proposition
that repair alone is infringement when the original use was unautho-
treatment given in the original district court opinion to Ford's infringement and concluded
that its own attention in the earlier decision had been directed primarily to the basic
question of repair versus reconstruction. Id. at 54. This question was only relevant to a
consideration of the allegation of contributory infringement with respect to licensed
General Motors cars since Ford's unauthorized use of the Convertible tops constituted a
direct infringement and thus obviated any need to resort to a reconstruction concept.
1071Id. at 56.
108 Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Aro I did refer to this distinction.
365 U.S. at 368.
109 377 U.S. at 479.
11o Additionally, Aro II considered the element of knowledge required by section 271(c)
for a finding of contributory infringement. Although knowledge is particularly significant
to a determination of monetary liability, Aro I disregarded this element. 377 U.S. at 488.
See Moseley, The Knowledge Requirement of Contributory Infringement and the Aro Case,
47 J. PAT. Orr. Soc'y 98 (1965), for a thorough discussion of the legislative considerations
leading to the enactment of § 271(c) of the Patent Act, in particular the development of
the knowledge concept.
1 377 U.S. at 492.
112 The Mercoid Court held that the defense of patent misuse barred a contributory
infringement action. 320 U.S. at 668. However, the second Aro Court stated that section
271(c) was enacted for the "express purpose of reinstating the doctrine of contributory
infringement as it had been developed by decisions prior to Mercoid, and of overruling any
blanket invalidation of the doctrine that could be found in the Mercoid opinions." 377 U.S.
at 492.
1973]
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rized since the repair operates to perpetuate the infringing use."8 The
Court stated:
The reconstruction-repair distinction is decisive, however, only
when the replacement is made in a structure whose original manu-
facture and sale have been licensed by the patentee, as was true only
of the General Motors cars; when the structure is unlicensed, as was
true of the Ford cars, the traditional rule is that even repair consti-
tutes infringement.... This aspect of the case was not considered
or decided by our opinion in Aro 1.114
The minority Justices in Aro II maintained, however, that Aro I con-
sidered the issue of contributory infringement as it applied to replace-
ment fabric for both the licensed General Motors and the unlicensed
Ford cars. They felt that there was no reason to draw a distinction be-
tween the two situations.115
This statement is particularly significant because the dissenters in
Aro II had all been members of the majority in Aro 1.116 The Aro 11
dissent reiterated the earlier holding that the patent monopoly could
not be applied to the unpatented fabric element regardless of any lack
of authorization for use of the entire patented combination.117 Thus,
the Aro 11 dissenters would accord no significance to the licensing of
General Motors. 118 These Justices were, of course, in the best position
to clarify that the intent of Aro I was not to differentiate between the
General Motors and Ford situations. This creates at least one problem:
since Aro 11 did not expressly overrule the licensing aspect of the Aro I
holding and that holding is at least arguably as the Aro 11 dissenters
would have it, it could be claimed that the mere unlicensed use of a
device covered by a combination patent does not make a supplier of an
element for the device a contributory infringer.119 It is clear, however,
that, if Aro 11 does indeed permit this escape from liability via Aro I,
113 See Janes, Infringement, supra note 17, at 446.
114 377 U.S. at 480.
115 Id.
116 Justice Black, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Aro II, suggested that a change
in Court personnel resulted in the different holding. Justice Whittaker, the author of the
majority opinion in Aro 1, was replaced by Justice White, who, with Justices Harlan, Stewart,
Goldberg and Brennan, formed the majority in Aro II. 377 U.S. at 521. Justices Harlan and
Stewart had dissented in Aro I. Justice Goldberg replaced Aro I's dissenting Justice Frank-
furter while Justice Brennan had already drawn the Aro 11 distinction in his Aro I
concurring opinion. In light of the sharp line later drawn between General Motors and
Ford replacements in Aro II, Justice Brennan's concurrence in Aro I could effectively be
considered a dissenting opinion.
117Id. at 519.
118 Id.
119 Accord, Connor, supra note 85, at 133.
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it is limited to unauthorized suppliers of non-material elements because
of the later decision's restoration of the "heart of the invention" test. 20
The judicial restoration of the essential element doctrine makes
Aro 11 one of the few recent Supreme Court decisions that strengthens
the patent system. Through reinstatement of the pre-Mercoid concepts
of contributory infringement, the combination patent could properly
protect some unpatented elements. With dominance and inventiveness
of the element in question once again given primary consideration,
Mercoid's prima facie refusal to protect any unpatented element was
rejected. 2 1 This holding was more realistic, giving greater recognition
to the policy concepts behind the patent system and the need to give
the inventor of a combination broader protection.
PARTIAL MANUFACTURE AND EXPORT
In an analogous area, the recent Supreme Court decision, Deep-
south Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,22 perpetuates the improper appli-
cation of the patent laws. This action was commenced in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana by the Laitram Corporation,
assignee of a combination patent for a machine that cleaned and de-
veined shrimp, 23 against the Deepsouth Packing Company.124 Laitram
charged that Deepsouth infringed its patent through manufacture in
the United States of all the elements of the patented deveining machine
and their subsequent assembly (by Deepsouth) at the customer's facility
in Brazil. Laitram sought to enjoin Deepsouth from such activity.
120 377 U.S. at 485-86, 491-92. One commentator has said:
Now the situation has changed entirely . . . [with) the Supreme Court believing
that protection may be afforded to an individual element of a patented combina-
tion.... [lit is [now) reasonable to protect from direct and contributory infringe-
ment elements which go to the heart of a combination patent.
Connor, supra note 85, at 135.
121 377 U.S. at 491-92.
122 406 U.S. 518 (1972). See generally the discussions of this case in Lipman, Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.-How to Succeed in Deveining Without Really Trying, 54
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 695 (1972); 58 A.B.A.J. 1226 (1972); 41 FGRDHAM L. RLv. 458 (1972); 10
HoUsrON L. Rev. 216 (1972).
123 The validity and priority of the Laitram patent had been established in earlier
actions. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. La. 1969), afftd,
443 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971). The elements of the combination were individually un-
patentable. Furthermore, each element was available commercially and shown in suppliers'
catalogues. The Laitram patent was awarded for the novelty of the combination of the
known elements.
The first district court opinion held that the Laitram and Deepsouth machines were
substantially the same and thus, under the doctrine of equivalents, Laitram's patent was
infringed. An injunction specifically prohibiting Deepsouth from selling its infringing
machine in the United States was issued.
124 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 310 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. La. 1970).
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The district court relied on the earlier decisions of the Second,
Third and Seventh Circuits in Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea
(Andrea 1),125 Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry
Co., 126 and Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Company,' 27 respectively,
and concluded that its injunction in an earlier infringement action
against Deepsouth could not properly be used to guard against less than
complete manufacture and assembly within the United States. The
Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously, 128 holding that, since Deepsouth
manufactured all parts for its deveiner in the United States and assem-
bled it to such a degree before exporting that the machine could be
made operable by a mere one hour final assembly abroad, there was a
direct infringement of Laitram's patent. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court heard the case. In a 5-4 decision, 129 the Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit, restoring the holding of the district court.
The district court had relied heavily on the Second Circuit's first
decision in the Andrea I case.' 30 In Andrea I the defendants manufac-
tured all the components of a patented radio receiver but, to avoid in-
fringement, packed the receiver chassis and uninstalled vacuum tubes
separately (although they were shipped in the same carton) for exclu-
sively foreign sales. The court stated:
No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed.
His monopoly does not cover the manufacture or sale of separate
elements capable of being, but never actually, associated to form
the invention. Only when such association is made is there a direct
infringement of his monopoly, and not even then if it is done out-
side the territory for which the monopoly was granted.131
125 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935).
126 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1956). This case concerned a defendant who manufactured
and sold a steel rolling mill to users overseas. The mill, though manufactured in the United
States, was shipped abroad before it was assembled. The plaintiff patentee had licensed
the defendant to manufacture such mills but a controversy arose over the royalties involved
in this sale. The defendant escaped liability because the place of final assembly was beyond
the limits of American patent protection.
127371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966). Hewitt-Robins dealt with a patented reclaiming
apparatus. Plaintiff Hewitt-Robins, as assignee of the patent, brought the action against
Link-Belt. The defendant had contracted to supply the reclaiming apparatus to purchasers
in Enegli, Turkey. The patented apparatus was never assembled in the United States and
parts were sent to Turkey in numerous shipments over a three month period. This case
can dearly be distinguished from Deepsouth by the degree of assembly required at the
place of foreign usage. In Hewitt-Robins the assembly took months while in Deepsouth it
took merely one hour although the equipment was complex and weighed over one and
three quarter tons.
128 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971).
129 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
130310 F. Supp. at 929.
131 79 F.2d at 628 (emphasis added).
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The later Cold Metal and Hewitt-Robins cases cited by the Deepsouth
district court added little to the analysis of this situation. These later
cases cited Andrea I as the primary reason for their holdings.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the above decisions in Deepsouth and
rejected their reasoning, stating that "the courts have worked them-
selves into what we perceive to be a conceptual box."'.8 2 The court of
appeals argued that the term "makes" in section 271 (a)'13 should be given
a realistic construction,3 4 i.e., it should be read as meaning "what it
ordinarily connotes -the substantial manufacture of the constituent
parts of the machine."'135 Thus, the court held:
[W]hen all parts of a patented machine are produced in the United
States and, in merely minor respects, the machine is to be finally
assembled for its intended use in a foreign country .... the machine
is "made" within the United States.136
One year later, the Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals
in an opinion written by Justice White. Citing Aro I and Mercoid v.
Mid-Continent Investment Co., 137 the Supreme Court reiterated the
rigid rule that a combination patent protects only the entire com-
bination and not the unpatented elements.13s On that premise, the
Court rejected the view that substantial manufacture of the constituent
parts of a machine results in direct infringement of a combination
patent. 39 The Court quoted Judge Swan's declaration for the Second
Circuit in the Andrea I case, "[The] relationship is the essence of the
patent,"' 40 and concluded that, unless all the elements are assembled,
there is no "essence" to be violated by the manufacturing exporter.' 4 '
182 443 F.2d at 938.
133 25 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(Emphasis added.)
134 443 F.2d at 988.
135 Id. at 939. (Emphasis added.)
1361d.
137 220 U.S. 661 (1944).
138 406 U.S. at 528-29.
189 Id.
140 79 F.2d at 628, quoted in 406 U.S. at 529.
141 This attitude is unrealistic. By their selection of the words "makes," "uses" and
"sells," the framers of the Patent Act were obviously trying to offer the patentee an
attractive exclusive right. He could exclude others from making, using or selling his
invention. Since it is to be presumed that each of these words has independent legislative
significance, an interesting argument that would produce a result contrary to Deepsouth
can be developed. The argument would run as follows: First, it would be noted that, in
addition to its explicit meaning, the term "use" protects the patentee where another
appropriates the benefit of his invention and, without authority, makes and then uses the
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The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Blackmun and joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist,142 identi-
fied the major weakness in the majority's argument, a point not high-
lighted by the court of appeals but one discussed by commentators prior
to the Supreme Court's Deepsouth decision. 143 The authority of Andrea
I, relied on by the majority, was substantially undermined by the modi-
fied opinion of the same court just two years later,144 reversing the
holding and arguably overruling the rationale of the original decision.
This later case held that the sale of the substantially assembled parts of
the patented combination for a minor final assembly and use abroad
was a direct infringement since the entire combination was made, sold
and practically completely assembled in the United States.
It is the opinion of this author that the second Andrea case com-
pletely eviscerated the first decision because, in its modification, the
Second Circuit neutralized its prior holding point for point. Seeking
to narrow the Andrea 1I holding, the Cold Metal145 and Hewitt-
Robins'40 courts incorrectly relied upon only one of the distinctions
drawn by the majority in Andrea I1147 - complete assembly for testing
purposes and subsequent disassembly before shipment. However, im-
mediately following its observation regarding assembly for testing
purposes, Andrea II also noted:
Where the elements of an invention are thus sold in substantially
unified and combined form, infringement may not be avoided by a
device himself. Similarly, "sells" protects the patentee from one who, without authority,
makes and then sells the device. Thus, since a domestic maker of a fully assembled com-
bination (i.e., the only type of "maker" Deepsouth would provide protection against) could
invariably be found guilty of use or sales infringement, the inclusion of the term "makes"
in section 271(a) would be unnecessary unless a broader meaning were intended. Second,
it would be pointed out that, in fact, the only situation in which one can use or sell a
patented device without also necessarily incurring liability for making it as well, occurs
when that device is made or purchased outside the United States and then imported by
the ultimate user or seller. In any but this infrequent situation the prohibition of "making"
the patented item is necessarily included in the very terms "sells" and "uses." Third, it
would be determined that it is, therefore, a reasonable interpretation of the framers' intent
to conclude that "makes" has a broader meaning than that attributed to it in Deepsouth
and that it could specifically protect the patentee from an exporter-manufacturer who only
makes the item in this country and ships it abroad for sale or use. Allowing a manufacturer
to escape liability because minor, insubstantial elements are not finally assembled before
shipment abroad seems to be contrary to the overall intent of § 271(a) of the Patent Act.
142 406 U.S. at 532.
143 See, e.g., Comment, Tightening the Screws on Minor Assemblies Abroad: The
Meaning of "Makes" Under the Patent Infringement Statute, 57 IOWA L. REv. 889, 891-97
(1972).
144 Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937).
145 235 F.2d at 230.
146 371 F.2d at 230-31.
147 90 F.2d at 613.
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separation or division of parts which leaves to the purchaser a sim-
ple task of integration.148
The court then quoted its earlier Andrea I holding, pointing out
that
[the judgment was made] on the basis that the defendants were
manufacturing and selling a complete combination which infringed,
even though the tubes were not inserted in the sockets of the re-
ceiver at the time of sale.j49
Going even further, the court held that the sale in the United States
of the supposedly disassembled receiver constituted infringement be-
cause "[t]he single package contained all the elements of the combina-
tion"15 and thus was a "sale" of the patented device. Therefore, the
assembly for testing purposes analysis was merely one aspect of the deci-
sion and not a proper basis for distinguishing the Cold Metal and
Hewitt-Robins cases from Andrea II. The primary consideration should
be the substantial combination of all the elements. In Deepsouth, there
was a sale of the entire combination1 51 - although not fully assembled,
all the elements were present.
The Andrea I opinion restated the rule that a combination patent
protects only the entire combination. Andrea II noted that the defen-
dant appellant did in fact sell the whole combination, the only mitigat-
ing factor being that the vacuum tubes needed cursory insertion to
make the combination operable. However, only sale of a complete com-
bination, not sale of an operable combination, was required by the
Patent Act.L2
To clarify its holding and complete its analysis, Andrea I1 discussed
the defendant's right to use the tubes 53 as an element in an unautho-
rized combination.
Judge Swan, 54 in his partial dissent to Andrea II, stated that the
Second Circuit's later holding overruled its decision in Andrea I. He
expressed his agreement with the second holding on the merits but
148 Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 614.
150 Id.
151 Liability under the "sales" aspect was also discussed by the Court.
152 90 F.2d at 614.
153 The existence of other uses for the tubes and the written notice accompanying the
sale of each tube stating that "tubes are to be used in systems already licensed for use"
negated any implied license to use the tubes in this unauthorized combination. Thus, the
defendant's use of the tubes was an infringement. Id. at 615.
154 Judge Swan had written the opinion of the court in Andrea 1, and would, there-
fore, have been well aware of its intent.
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dissented because he felt the court should not disregard its earlier opin-
ion before the Supreme Court had an opportunity to review it.' 55
In light of Andrea II, the precedential value of the line of cases
that relied upon Andrea I must be viewed cautiously. As mentioned
earlier, neither Cold Metal nor Hewitt-Robins added any significant
independent basis for their holdings. Indeed, the court in Hewitt-
Robins demonstrated a superficial treatment of this aspect of patent law
by citing Aro I for the proposition that a combination patent covers
only the totality of the elements in the claim and that no element sepa-
rately viewed is within the grant.'56 Just two years prior to this Seventh
Circuit observation, the Aro 11 decision had demonstrated that such a
statement was no longer absolutely true.1 57
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit "deem[ed] it equally clear that
unassembled elements of a combination patent do not constitute the
'patented invention.' "158 This statement was totally unsupported by
authority 59 and demonstrated the court's desire to affirm the district
court holding. A more reasonable basis for such a result would have
been the factual distinction which could be drawn between Hewitt-
Robins and Andrea 11: in Hewitt-Robins there were separate shipments
of the various parts over a prolonged period of time and, even more
significantly, the assembly overseas was substantial.
The same argument cannot be used to distinguish Deepsouth from
Andrea II for, in both these cases, the entire combination was shipped
at one time and the final assembly abroad was really a "final sham
assembly."160
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING
The majority of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice White,
refused to find that Deepsouth's conduct infringed Laitram's patent.
The Court based its holding on a number of points which must have
had a synergistic effect because, when considered individually, they are
not persuasive at all.
Citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
155 90 F.2d at 615.
156 371 F.2d at 229.
157 377 U.S. at 485-86, 491-92. The opinion of the Court in Aro 11 expressly stated that
the sale of the fabric element by the unauthorized manufacturer made such manufacturer
liable as a contributory infringer under section 271(c). In this noteworthy instance the
unpatented element was indeed protected by the combination patent.
158 871 F.2d at 229.
159 See Comment, Tightening the Screws on Minor Assemblies Abroad: The Mean-
ing of "Makes" Under the Patent Infringement Statute, 57 IowA L. Rav. 889, 893 (1972).




Corp.,'61 the opinion first reiterated the principle that a combination
patent is awarded not for the novelty of the elements but for the novelty
of the combination which in some way exceeds the sum of its parts . 2
Thus, only the entire combination was entitled to patent protection.
In this case, however, Deepsouth did manufacture the entire combina-
tion. The patentable essence of the combination had been captured by
Deepsouth when it manufactured and substantially assembled the pat-
ented device. Once the novelty of a combination is present in the sub-
stantially assembled device and there is no other legitimate use for the
partial assembly, there is an effective misappropriation of enough of the
combination to be a direct and intentional infringement of the com-
bination patent - even though the minor assembly of unsubstantial
elements might be omitted or intended for a later point in time. 6 3
The Court did not consider such factors as the patentable essence
of the combination, often called the "heart of the invention." Instead, it
cited Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.' 64 and Aro I as
authority for an absolute principle that only the totality of elements is
protected by a combination patent. This theory is, however, now subject
to exceptions carved out by Congress and the case law. First, the strict
holdings of the Mercoid cases were expressly overruled by the enact-
ment of § 271 of the Patent Act of 1952.105 Second, the Aro II case
expressly revived the "heart of the invention" analysis, particularly in
the area of contributory infringement'0 0
Although it might be pointed out that Deepsouth's liability, to the
extent that it should have been found to exist, would not have resulted
from contributory infringement, 67 it is highly significant that the Court
majority so blatantly showed its tendency to ignore any patent law
developments, legislative or judicial, that expand protection of the
patentee from the misappropriation of the fruits of his labor.
On the question of sales liability, Deepsouth argued that there was
no unauthorized sale of a patented device because only compo-
nents were sold here and the "making" occurred outside the
United States. 68 This position was adopted by the Court and was justi-
fied by a narrow construction of the term "makes."' 69 However, this
181 406 U.S. at 552.
162 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
163 See D. DUNNER, et al., PATENT LAW PERSPECrIVES, supra note 160, at Dev. B.1(2)(a)-9.
164 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
165 See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
166 377 U.S. at 491-92.
167 406 U.S. at 526.
168 Id. at 523-24.
169 Id. at 528.
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aspect of the decision adds little to its weight because the Court relied
entirely on Andrea I where Judge Swan stated that something is "made"
when it reaches a state of final "operable" assembly. The Court disre-
garded the effect of Andrea II which conspicuously omitted the word
"operable" from the same court's re-analysis. Of significance in Andrea
II was the fact that all elements of the combination were made, packaged
together, and sold in the United States by the infringing manufacturer.
The last point to be considered by the Court1 70 was legislative intent
affecting this area of infringement. The majority felt that § 271 of the
Patent Act of 1952 was a mere codification of existing patent laws and
did not change them in any way.' 7 ' This reasoning was extended to en-
compass codification of the Andrea 1172 holding for, it was argued, if
Congress had intended to overrule that doctrine, it would have done so
expressly just as it had expressly overturned the Mercoid holdings.
However, it is contended by this author that at the time section 271 was
adopted, Andrea 1I,178 not Andrea 1, represented the courts' latest ex-
pression on the law of infringement applicable to the export of elements
of a substantially assembled patented combination. 74 Andrea II so
limited the Second Circuit's earlier ruling that the Deepsouth majority's
argument on this point is wholly lacking in persuasive value.
In its final discussion, the Court appeared to recognize the weak-
ness of some of its arguments and to reveal the true reason for its hold-
ing. Justice White indicated that it was the majority's opinion that a
contrary decision would constitute an overruling or modification of
prior case law, it being felt that such a modification should be based
on an argument stronger than Laitram's demand for recognition of the
equities of its situation.175 As a result, the Court permitted an unau-
thorized manufacturer to take advantage of another's disclosure of an
170 The Court also touched upon the availability of foreign patents to protect the
American patent holder beyond the territorial limits of the original patent. Id. at 531.
Foreign patenting is not always a practical solution. In countries with patent laws like
those of the United States, a patent application would be barred if made more than one
year after the same patent application was filed in any other country. Thus, an American
patentee would have to anticipate those foreign countries in which he would later need
patent protection and apply immediately. Even if this course of conduct could be pursued,
it would be finandally burdensome in many instances. Many countries assess their patent
holders an annual tax for the privilege of holding a patent monopoly. This tax is often
substantial and is levied regardless of whether the patent is used or not.
171 406 U.S. at 530 & n.10, citing the Congressional Record and a conversation between
Senators Saltonstall and McCarran, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.
172 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935).
173 90 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937).
174 Accord, 406 U.S. at 533 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Comment, Tightening the
Screws on Minor Assemblies Abroad: The Meaning "Makes" Under the Patent Infringement
Statute, 57 IowA 1. REv. 889, 895 (1972).
175 406 U.S. at 531.
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invention in compliance with the patent laws, to appropriate the fruits
of the patentee's labor without regard to patent law responsibility, and
then to hide behind an unrealistic and highly technical interpretation
of the same laws.
Conduct such as Deepsouth's is causing a failure of consideration
in the patent system. The consideration given to a patentee in exchange
for his disclosure is the right to exclude others from the use, manufac-
ture or sale of the disclosed invention in the United States. Much of the
value of this consideration is lost when another is allowed to substanti-
ally manufacture that device without incurring liability. 7 6 The Court
did not expressly state that such an interpretation of the Patent Act
would be incorrect 177 but based its holding on a reluctance to overturn
"strong" judicial precedents. 178 However, no such strong precedents
existed. As has been discussed above, reliance on Andrea I is erroneous.
Cold Metal 79 cited Andrea I without contributing any new develop-
ment while Hewitt-Robins80 simply cited Cold Metal and Andrea I and
is, furthermore, distinguishable on its facts.' 8 ' Thus, to have overruled
such weak precedent and affirmed the holding of the court of appeals
would not have been a difficult step.
In its failure to recognize the possible consequences of its holding,
the Court took refuge behind the assertion that such an expansion of the
patent law as Laitram proposed is a legislative task not to be initiated
by the courts in the absence of some "sign" of congressional approval. 8 2
In so reasoning, the Court ignored the example of the doctrine of
equivalents. That patent law doctrine is nothing more than a court-
developed equity concept which has broadened the patent grant pro-
tection.183 Under it, if an alleged infringer has changed one or more of
the elements of a patented item to a substantially similar substance that
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way,
he is held liable for infringement by equivalency.
This doctrine evolved in response to the moral and practical obli-
gation to protect the patented item. Although a solid constituent of
176 See note 141 supra.
177 Although the Court did not argue that monopolies are per se undesirable, the
majority referred to a suggestion to that effect in Graham v. John-Deere, 883 US. 1 (1966).
406 US. at 530 n.11, et. seq.
178 See 406 U.S. at 528.
179 Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1956).
See note 126 supra.
180 Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Company, 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966). See note
127 supra.
181 I.e., the substantial assembly overseas. Id.
182406 US. at 531-32.
188 See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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patent jurisprudence, the rule has never received legislative recognition.
Clearly, the failure to codify this rule in the Patent Act of 1952 cannot be
construed as a legislative renunciation but, more properly, as an implied
concurrence. If the courts had waited for a "sign" from the legislature
before applying the doctrine of equivalents, the patent system would
have all but disappeared in the 120 years since Winans v. Denmead.8 4
Immediately after the district court holding in Deepsouth, some
commentators'8 5 recognized the analogy between the doctrine of equiv-
alents and substantial manufacture and export:
[The district court] ignore[d] the fact that sale of the unassembled
parts of a patented combination - at least when most of the parts
have no other substantial use or are clearly intended to be combined
to create the patented combination - is fully the equivalent of sell-
ing the parts assembled. The unassembled subterfuge works the
same kind of constructive fraud on the patentee that the Supreme
Court refused to permit in its Graver Tank decision by invoking
the doctrine of equivalents.' 86
This statement assumes even greater significance when the degree of
domestic assembly of the combination components in Deepsouth is
considered. The final Brazilian assembly of the one and three quarter
ton machine took less than one hour.
Contributory infringement also originated as a judicial concept.
Until it was first recognized in Wallace v. Holmes, 87 there was no basis
for the extension of infringement liability to a supplier of the elements
of a patented combination. The Wallace holding operated to make the
supplier of the almost complete combination liable. That doctrine
survived the next 70 years with various expansions and narrowings 88
until it was effectively abolished by the Mercoid cases in 1944. Only
then did the legislature take the opportunity to place its imprimatur on
the doctrine in § 271 of the Patent Act of 1952. The concept of con-
tributory infringement was then codified as it existed prior to the
Mercoid cases. If the severe limitation by Mercoid had not occurred, the
legislature might not have expressly acknowledged the doctrine at all.
The "sign" sought by the Court has, in fact, already been mani-
fested in the expressions of congressional intent leading to the enact-
ments of the patent acts from the original act of 1790189 to the present
18456 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
185 See D. DUNNER, et al., PATENT LAW PERsPEcrivFs, supra note 160, at Dev. B.1(2)(a)-2
(1969-1970 Annual Review).
186 Id. (footnotes omitted).
187 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (No. 17,100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
188 See Hildreth, Contributory Infringement, supra note 22, at 541-42.
189 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
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act of 1952. The thrust of these acts has uniformly revealed the legisla-
tive intent to be the legal and moral protection of the inventor and
the encouragement of full and frank disclosure of his invention.
PROPOSED TEST
A distinction must be made between the liability attaching to a
Deepsouth situation and that applied to the conduct of a manufacturer
who intends a bona fide sale of only some elements of a patented com-
bination to a user outside the United States. In Deepsouth, the sub-
stantial manufacture and assembly of the combination in the United
States was so complete that the complex machine could be finally
assembled in just one hour.
To draw such a distinction, this author proposes that the courts
use a test based on the essence of the combination, i.e., if there is such
substantial manufacture of the elements of a patented combination in
the United States that the patentable aspect of the combination is
captured and no practical use can be made of the manufactured ele-
ments other than assembly into the patented combination, there is a
direct infringement. The element of knowledge becomes moot as it can
easily be inferred from the conduct of an infringer meeting this test.
If sales are significantly limited to users beyond the territorial bounds
of the United States patent, it can be inferred that the seller knew of
the existence of the protection within the United States.
This test, set out in statutory form in the introduction to this
paper,190 could also be added to section 271 by Congress in order to
clarify the line of cases in the area. Andrea I would then be expressly
overruled and Andrea 11 adopted. Cold Metal would become a question
of fact as to the extent of the overseas assembly and Hewitt-Robins
would be affirmed on its facts since the final assembly in Turkey took
fully three months and was clearly not a "minor assembly abroad."
CONCLUSION
As the Deepsouth dissenters pointed out, the results of that holding
will effectively frustrate the constitutional intent that shaped the patent
system.191 The Supreme Court's refusal to apply a more realistic inter-
pretation of the section 271 term "makes" is tantamount to a tacit
approval of the type of "iniquitous and evasive"'1 2 operation resorted
to by Deepsouth. With the importance presently attached to world
o190 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
191 406 U.S. at 534.
192 Id. at 533.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
trade, it would seem that a broader interpretation of "makes" is neces-
sary.
When the framers of the Constitution promised a limited monopoly
to an inventor' 93 and offered the United States as the territorial limit
of its protection, world trade was certainly not the factor it is today.
At that time, a monopoly in this country was very attractive to the
inventor and effective in its purpose of encouraging disclosure. Today,
with world trade such a tremendous consideration in marketing and
sales, 94 it has become more important that the full breadth of patent
protection be afforded the patentee. 95 It is an abuse of the patent sys-
tem whose purpose it is to encourage the disclosure of invention to use
that very system to assist a manufacturer who resorts to devious means
to circumvent another's patent by substantial domestic manufacture of
the same article. Condoning this practice obviates the need for the
unauthorized manufacturer to qualify with the requisite patentable
improvement intended to promote the growth of science and technol-
ogy.
A test such as that formulated above would establish both a guide-
line for future conduct and a standard that can be uniformly and
consistently applied.'96 If so much of the combination has been manu-
factured that the patentable aspect is present and no substantial use
other than assembly into the patented combination can be found, equity
concepts and substantial fairness 9 7 require that such manufacture
193 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
194 The Court in Deepsouth stated that a judgment of affirmance would have given
Laitram's patent extraterritorial effect. Such a statement is not absolutely accurate because
Laitram sought to prohibit not foreign use, but domestic manufacture by a domestic cor-
poration.
United States patents have indirectly been given extraterritorial effect in an analogous
area. The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337A (1970), provides that the importation of
goods made, produced, processed or mined by means of a process patented in the United
States (although the goods themselves are not patented) will be forbidden when a showing
can be made to the President of the United States that an established domestic industry
will be damaged by such importation. In effect, the Tariff Act forbids use of the United
States-patented process in a foreign country by prohibiting the importation of goods so
made.
The Tariff Act proceeding is like an infringement action in the sense that the defense
of patent invalidity is available to the importer.
See also, Comment, Gottschalk v. Benson -The Supreme Court Takes a Hard Line on
Software, 47 ST. JOHN's L. Rrv. at 635 n.85 (1973) where the "Paris Convention's" delibera-
tions concerning a multi-national patent system are discussed.
195 Contra, Comment, 29 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 173 (1972).
196 Once a standard is established, the courts are properly left to determine the factual
issue of liability. Such a fact-finding process, in the area of substantial manufacture, would
be not unlike the questions considered by a court handling a doctrine of equivalents case.
197 In the area of collateral estoppel affecting patent validity, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated its willingness to rely on the trial court's sense of equity and justice. Blonder-
Tongue Corp. v. University of Mll. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 349 (1971).
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constitute an infringing "mak[ing]" under § 271 of the Patent Act of
1952. A more realistic holding would result from the application of this
standard and would avoid what the minority1 98 in Deepsouth cautions
could be a trend that will "subvert the Constitutional scheme of
promoting 'The Progress of Science and Useful Arts.' "199
-Neil M. Zipkin
198 Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. Perhaps personnel
factors alone will result in a change of the judicial attitude of the high Court as it did in
the Aro cases. Significantly, the four newest appointees to the Supreme Court comprise the
minority in this decision.
199 406 U.S. at 534, quoting U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, and citing the unanimous opinion
of the court of appeals per Judge Clark in Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443
F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971).
